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Abstract
Specific vectorial boolean functions, such as S-Boxes or APN functions
have many applications, for instance in symmetric ciphers. In cryptog-
raphy they must satisfy some criteria (balancedness, high nonlinearity,
high algebraic degree, avalanche, or transparency [2, 7]) to provide best
possible resistance against attacks. Functions satisfying most criteria are
however difficult to find. Indeed, random generation does not work [5, 6]
and the S-Boxes used in the AES or Camellia ciphers are actually vari-
ations around a single function, the inverse function in F2n . Would the
latter function have an unforeseen weakness (for instance if more practical
algebraic attacks are developped), it would be desirable to have some re-
placement candidates. For that matter, we propose to weaken a little bit
the algebraic part of the design of S-Boxes and use finite semifields instead
of finite fields to build such S-Boxes. Since it is not even known how many
semifields there are of order 28, we propose to build S-Boxes and APN
functions via semifields pseudo-extensions of the form S2
24
, where S24 is
any semifield of order 24. Then, we mimic in this structure the use of func-
tions applied on a finite fields, such as the inverse or the cube. We report
here the construction of 12781 non equivalent S-Boxes with with maximal
nonlinearity, differential invariants, degrees and bit interdependency, and
2684 APN functions.
Keywords: S-Boxes; APN functions; semifields.
1 Introduction
A substitution-box (denoted S-Box), is a tool used in symmetric ciphers in order
to increase their resistance against known attacks, such as linear and differential
cryptanalysis, by breaking cipher linearity. S-Boxes are commonly represented
by boolean functions i.e. S : Fn2 → F
m
2 , whose dimensions n,m depend on the
cipher. For example, the AES S-Box uses n = m = 8, views the finite field with
1
256 elements as a vector space on its base field, and is generated by:
T : F28 → F28
0 7→ 0
a 7→ a−1
(1)
Once T is computed, an affine transformation is applied [4], and the result
is in an excellent S-Box from the point of view of security characteristics. More
precisely, in the following, we will use the list of criteria described in [2]. These
criteria measure S-Boxes robustness with respect to possible attacks. Among
bijective S-Boxes, only AES and Camellia’s S-Boxes have good scores on all of
these measures and both S-Boxes are build on a modified inverse computation.
Thus, would the latter function have an unforeseen weakness (for instance if
more practical algebraic attacks are developped), it would be desirable to have
some replacement candidates.
Rather than trying different constructions, some works [2], [5] have been
made on random searches among the 256! possibilities of bijective S-Boxes.
Another approach is to design S-Boxes via the use of chaotic maps [6]. Unfor-
tunately, none of the S-Boxes build from these searches have the resistance of
AES against linear nor differential attacks.
Our idea is different, we replace the algebraic structure of AES and Camellia
(namely viewing the vector space as a finite field) by another structure, a semi-
field. First, there exists different semifields of a given order up to isomorphism.
Even when considering the more restrictive notion of isotopy [1], the semifields
are still non unique. Therefore there could be several choices of underlying
structure, even with a single function. Second, the nonzero elements of semi-
fields still form a multiplicative group. Thus an inverse-like function could very
well preserve good cryptographic properties. This idea could also be efficient
for Almost Perfect non-Linear functions, defined as vectorial boolean function
verifying an almost perfect score to the differential invariant (see also [2], for in-
stance). In the latter case, we will show that mimicking, e.g., the cube function
on semifields enables us to generate APN functions.
In Section 2, we recall the definition of semifields and propose a construction
of a degree 2 pseudo-extension of semifields of order 16. From this construction
we deduce bijective S-Boxes from F82 to F
8
2, that mimic the behavior of the
above Function (1). We also present some efficient algorithms for semifields
constructions in Section 3. Then we recall in Section 4, the criteria that we use to
rank the obtained S-Boxes. Finally, we show in Section 5 that our construction
indeed yields novel S-Boxes and APN functions that match the resistance of the
best known ones.
2 Semifields pseudo-extensions
In this section, after defining semifields, we describe the construction of pseudo-
extensions of degree 2 of semifields containing 16 elements.
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Definition 1. A finite semifield (S,+,×) is a set S containing at least two
elements, and associated with two binary laws (addition and multiplication),
such that:
1. (S,+) is a group with neutral 0
2. ∀a, b ∈ S, ab = 0⇒ a = 0 or b = 0
3. ∀a, b, c ∈ S : a(b + c) = ab+ ac and (a+ b)c = ac+ bc
4. ∀a ∈ S, ∃ a neutral element for × denoted as e which satisfies: ea = ae = a
Ideally, we would like to construct S-Boxes using:
T ′ : S28 → S28
0 7→ 0
a 7→ a−1
Unfortunately, we do not know the complete classification of these semifields
for the moment. Currently, the largest classification in characteristic 2 is of
order 64 [8]. Thus, in order to build S-Boxes with 256 elements, we mimic
the finite fields construction, based on a quotient structure: F28 = F24 [X ]/P2.
However, the same notion of polynomial irreducibility is more difficult to define
in semifields, due to the possible non-associativity.
Actually, we just need to build a bijection T ′ : (S24)
2 → (S24)
2 as close as
possible to the inverse function, in order to (hopefully) take advantage of its
cryptographic properties. Therefore, we have to find an equivalent characteri-
zation to the polynomial irreducibility notion on in finite fields, applicable on
semifields. Let P (X) = X2+αX+β, with α, β ∈ F24 , be an irreducible polyno-
mial of degree 2. Elements of F28 viewed as F24 [X ]/P are polynomials of degree
1 of the form aX + b, denoted as couple (a, b) ∈ F224 . Over the finite field F28 ,
the inverse of 0X + b is 0X + u, where u = b−1 ∈ F24 if b 6= 0. Then if a 6= 0,
we let γ ∈ F24 be such that γ = a
−1b, in order to obtain an unitary couple
and thus simplify the following computations. Then, the inverse of aX + b is
denoted c′X+d′ and we have (aX+ b)(c′X+d′) = 1⇔ a(X+γ)(c′X+d′) = 1
or also (X + γ)(cX + d) = 1, with c′ = a−1c and d′ = a−1d.
After degree identification, and replacing X2 = −αX − β, we obtain:
{
dγ − cβ = 1
cγ + d− cα = 0
(2)
Finally, we have: {
c = [(α − γ)γ − β]−1
d = c(α− γ)
(3)
From the previous equations, it is now easy to deduce the following alterna-
tive characterisation of irreducible polynomials of degree 2 over finite fields:
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Lemma 1. Let P : X2 + αX + β,∈ F24 [X ], P is irreducible if and only if
∀γ ∈ F24 , [(α− γ)γ − β] 6= 0.
Using Lemma 1, we thus propose the following definition over semifields:
Definition 2 (Pseudo-irreducibility). Let P = X2 + αX + β ∈ S24 [X ], P is
pseudo-irreducible if and only if ∀γ ∈ S24 , [(α− γ)γ − β] 6= 0.
Thus, in the case where S24 ≃ F24 , our pseudo-irreducibility notion reduces
to irreducibility. Now we are able to define our pseudo-inversion as:
Lemma 2. Let P : X2 + αX + β,∈ S24 [X ] be a pseudo-irreducible polynomial.
The transformation:
T ′ : (S24)
2 → (S24)
2
(0, 0) 7→ (0, 0)
(0, b) 7→ (0, b−1)
(a, b) 7→ (a−1c, a−1d)
such that γ = a−1b, c = [(α − γ)γ − β]−1, and d = c(α− γ), is a bijection.
Proof. In the case where a = 0, T ′ is obviously one-to-one. Let us assume now
that a 6= 0.
For proving injectivity, we suppose that ∃γ1, γ2 ∈ S24 such that c(α− γ1) =
c(α− γ2). Then cα− cγ1 = cα− cγ2, so that c(γ1− γ2) = 0 and thus c
−1c(γ1−
γ2) = 0. Finally γ1 = γ2.
Then, as S224 has a finite cardinality, any injective endofunction is bijective.
3 Semifields efficient generation
As a prerequisite for constructing pseudo-extensions, we need semifields of order
24. In this section, we expose some results and optimizations about efficient
generation of semifields. Recent results about semifields are detailed in [3] and
in particular, they show that we can represent semifields as matrix vector spaces:
Proposition 1 ( [3], Prop 3.). There exists a finite semifield S of dimension
n over Fq ⊆ S iff there exists a set of n matrices {A1, ...An} ⊆ GL(n, q) such
that:
• A1 is the identity matrix
•
n∑
i=1
λiAi ∈ GL(n, q), ∀(λ1, ..., λn) ∈ F
n
q \{0}
• The first column of the matrix Ai is the column vector with a 1 in the i
th
position, and 0 everywhere else.
4
This proposition is fundamental, since it allows us to use efficients matrix
computations to discover new semifields. In our case, we restrict this proposition
to q = 2, and n ≤ 8.
In order to generate semifields, we use the algorithms described in [8]. The
idea is to select lists of matrices extracted from GL(n, 2) with a prescribed
first column. It is thus necessary to check invertibility of all possible linear
combinations, in order to gradually reduce the possible semifield candidates. In
practice, the invertibility check is done by a determinant computation. Then, in
order to accelerate the process, some combinations of matrices can be discarded,
as they can yield already found spaces. This is formalized via the notion of
isotopy of semifields:
Definition 3 (Isotopy). Let S1and S2 be two semifields over the same finite
field Fp, then an isotopy between S1 and S2 is a triple (F,G,H) of bijective
linear maps S1 → S2 over Fp such that H(ab) = F (a)G(b), ∀a, b ∈ S1
Definition 3 is used to define an equivalence relation between semifields,
which can be verified with the help of matrix multiplications, see [3, Prop. 2].
Even if only square matrices with small size are involved, semifield generation
remains complex for the large amount of computations involved. For instance,
generation of all matrices constituting GL(8, 2) could require 264 determinant
computations.
For S24 this is less important, but any improvement becomes substantial if
you are to generate many S-Boxes and experiment with them. We thus propose
in the following some optimization for the computation of the determinant and
of matrix multiplication, based on tabulation and Gray codes.
3.1 Optimizing determinant using double level Gray codes
and tabulations
Classical determinant computations use Gaussian elimination, with a O(23n
3)
complexity for a single determinant computation. Thus, in order to build
GL(n, 2) by testing all the possible matrices, we obtain an overall complexity
of O(23n
32n
2
). Here, we present two ways to reduce this complexity.
The first optimization is about tabulating the computations via the recur-
rence formula of the Laplace expansion of determinants:
• If A is 1× 1 matrix, det(A) = a, with A = (a).
• Otherwise, n ≥ 2,
det(A) =
n∑
i=1
(−1)i+jajM1j
with M1j the determinant of the submatrix defined as A deprived of its
first row and of its jth column (we chose the first row deletion and the
column development arbitrarilly).
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More precisely, since we have to compute all determinants for each matrix
size, the idea is to store them in order to accelerate the computations of the
larger matrix dimension. By doing this, we replace a sub-determinant computa-
tion by a table access. The drawback of this method is the memory limitation,
and we succeeded to apply it for square matrices up to size 6. Indeed, for n = 7,
we should store 249 computations, that being around 500 Tb of data.
Our second optimization is about improving the way of passing through
all matrices. Since each matrix has a unique integer representation (using the
n2 bits as digits), the easiest method to go through all the determinants is to
increment this integer representation until its largest value. However, it implies
”random” modifications on the matrix binaries coefficients. By using a Gray
code, which allows to pass from a value to another by modifying only one bit
between them, we are thus able to pass from one determinant to the other by
modifying only one term in the sum: the idea is to cut the matrix in two parts,
the first row on the one hand, containing n bits, and the remainding n(n− 1)
coefficients, which we call the base, on the other hand. Then we apply two
distinct Gray codes, one for each hand. First, we fix a value for the base, and
then we go all over possible values for the first row, following a Gray code on
this row. Second, we change the base value with another dedicated Gray code,
and go again through all possible values from the first line. Memory exchange is
thus reduced because we only need to access the lower dimension table n times
for each possible submatrix determinant, but for 2n computations.
The complexity is also drastically reduced by linking successive computa-
tions. Indeed, by modifying only one bit between two values, the determinant
computation is reduced to the following formula: ∆k = ∆k−1⊕M1j , whereM1j
is defined as in the previous formula, and ∆0 = 0, since in a Gray code the
first number is 0. Thus, we reduced the determinant computation, which would
normally requires n− 1 XOR operations to only one, for n ≤ 7.
Finally, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let n be the dimension of squares matrices, n ≤ 6, then the com-
plexity of the determination of GL(n, 2), using tabulation and Gray codes, is
bounded by Dn that satisfies:
Dn = 2
n2 +O(2n
2−n−2) (4)
Proof. The complexity of the above algorithm is obtained by counting XOR
operations and is given by the following recurrence formula:
{
D1 = 0
Dn = Dn−1 + 2
n2 − 1
(5)
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Therefore, we have:
Dn =
n∑
i=2
(
2i
2
− 1
)
=
n−2∑
j=0
2(n−j)
2
− (n− 1)
= 2n
2
n−2∑
j=0
2−2nj+j
2
− (n− 1)
≤ 2n
2
n−2∑
j=0
2−2nj+(n−2)j − (n− 1)
= 2n
2
n−2∑
j=0
2(−n−2)j − (n− 1)
= 1−2
(−n−2)(n−1)
1−2−n−2 − (n− 1)
≤ 2n
2
(1 + 12n+2−1 )− (n− 1)
We thus have a gain of a factor 23n
3 over the naive Gaussian elimination.
3.2 Optimization of matrix multiplication by tabulation
Similarly, we can optimize matrix multiplication with some tabulations. A first
step consists in computing and storing all possible products between all values of
the first row of the left matrix, and half the right one. Then, the matrix product
A · B will simply be obtained by two table accesses per row of A (one for each
half of B). Therefore, for computing k products, we obtain a complexity bound
of O(2n+n⌈
n
2 ⌉(n− 1) + k2n). As comparison, if we used a scalars products and
transposition algorithms, we would have a complexity of O(kn2(n − 1)). As a
conclusion, we see that our optimization is interesting only if k > 2
n+n⌈n
2
⌉
n2+ 2n
n−1
. For
semifields generation, the number of equivalence test is of the order of 2n
2
and
the second term of the first complexity is therefore dominant. In this case our
optimization allows to gain another factor of n2 in the complexity bound.
4 S-Boxes criterion
Several criteria have been defined to measure S-Boxes resistance when faced to
different types of attacks. In order to select our S-Boxes, we have chosen the
following criteria, following mostly [2]. We denote by S the S-Box function.
1. Bijectivity. By construction we only look for bijective functions.
2. Fixed Points. We favor functions without any fix points nor reverse fix
points (as for the AES, this can be avoided by some affine transform on
the trial).
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3. Non-linearity. We return the linear invariant λS , defined as follows:
λS = max
a,b∈F2n ,b6=0
{| − 2n−1 +#{x ∈ F2n : (a|x) ⊕ (b|S(x)) = 0}|}
4. XOR table and differential invariant. A XOR table of S is based on the
computation of δS(a, b) = {x ∈ F2n : S(x) ⊕ S(a ⊕ x) = b}, ∀a, b ∈ F
n
2 .
The differential invariant δS is equal to
δS = max
a,b∈Fn2 ,a 6=0
|δS(a, b)| = max
a,b∈Fn2 ,a 6=0
|{x ∈ F2n : S(x)⊕ S(a⊕ x) = b}|.
5. Avalanche. Strict avalanche criterion of order k (SAC(k)) requires that
the function x 7→ S(x) ⊕ S(a ⊕ x) stays balanced for all a ∈ F2n of
weight inferior to k. The goal is to provide a 1/2 probability of outputs
modifications in case of k bits complemented for entries. In our case, we
measure the distance of the S-Box to SAC(1), component function by
component function, and we denote by AS = max
i=1..8
|2n−1 −
∑
x
Si(x) ⊕
Si(a⊕ x)| the obtained maximum.
6. Bit independance. Bit independancy is modelized by the computation of
SAC(1) on the function defined by the sum of any two columns or any
column of the matrix representation of S. As previously, we then measure
its distance to SAC(1), and we denote it by BS .
7. Transparency. This notion has been introduced by Prouff in [7], and allows
to measure the resistance of S-Boxes against differential power analysis.
The definition is the following:
TS = max
β∈Fn2
(
|n− 2H(β)|
−
1
2n(2n − 1)
∑
a∈Fn2
∣∣∣ ∑
v∈Fn2 ,H(v)=1
(−1)vβWDa,S(0, v)
∣∣∣
)
whereWDa,S(u, v) =
∑
x∈Fn2
(−1)v[S(x)+S(x+a)]+ux and H(x) is the hamming
weight.
By using this criteria, we are able to compare the efficiency of our S-Boxes
with the already existing ones.
For instance, the S-Boxes of AES and Camellia have minimal non-linearity
λAES = λCamellia = 16, minimal differential invariant among non-APN func-
tions, δAES = δCamellia = 4, very good bit independence BAES = BCamellia = 8
and avalanche criterion with Camellia slightly better on the latter: AAES = 8
and ACamellia = 6.
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5 Experimental results
5.1 Results of S-Boxes based on semifields pseudo-extensions
We have implemented a simple matrix arithmetic using our optimizations, in or-
der to generate semifields of order 16 plus their pseudo-extensions. We have then
constructed S-Boxes with the help of the pseudo-inverse bijection of Lemma 2,
and apply all the tests of Section 4.
We managed to generate 19336 semifields of order 24 (with possible isomor-
phic ones). In average, 98 polynomials per semifields were pseudo-irreducible,
with a minimum of 91 and a maximum of 120 (the latter for the finite field).
By testing all possible pseudo-irreducible polynomials for each semifield, we ob-
tained 12781 S-Boxes, with maximal nonlinearity, differential invariants, degrees
and bit interdependency.
Among the latter 8364 had fix points, and among the ones without fix points,
4122 had avalanche equal to 8 (as good as AES) and 288 had avalanche equal
to 6 (as good as Camellia). Among the (4122+ 288) latter S-Boxes, 863 have a
better transparency level than the inverse function on a finite field.
δ λ Alg deg Poly deg Fix point Av Bi Tr
AES 4 16 7 254 0 8 8 7.85319
Camellia1 4 16 7 254 0 6 8 7.85564
15306 4 16 7 254 0 8 8 7.84314
19203 4 16 7 254 0 6 8 7.84804
Table 1: Some resistance criteria for S-Boxes
For instance, in Table 1, ′15306′ represents the S-Box obtained with an
avalanche equals to 8, and lowest transparency score. The S-Box ′19203′ has
the best transparency score with an avalanche equals to 6.
To illustrate our approach, we give here the construction of our S-Box
′19203′. It is generated by the semifield generated by the linear combinations
of the matrices in Equation (6) below, with X2 + 6X + 1 as pseudo-irreducible
polynomial for the pseudo-extension, with 6 corresponding to 0110 in binary
and thus to the linear combination A2 +A3.

A1 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 , A2 =


0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0

 , A3 =


0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0

 , A4 =


0 1 0 1
0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1




(6)
Finally, we get Table 2 which shows the ′19203′ S-Box in hexadecimal.
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 3f 20 9a f9 5c 43 d8 a4 bb 7d 1e 85 c7 62 e6 1
1 8c b9 80 39 a1 9c ce a6 2c 97 5d 9d c6 a3 4f 6f
2 5b aa de 61 ab 32 24 22 9e 3d 4c ca 7b e5 65 d6
3 b4 bf 4b 35 fb b6 6b 50 53 5 92 f3 e4 4e 29 33
4 d0 40 4a bc d4 45 49 10 e0 b7 6c 8f c4 9 82 8
5 63 db 7f f1 e3 52 13 2a 28 60 5f f8 ec eb 2e c2
6 5e 25 4 41 69 95 72 34 75 4d 31 ac 26 f0 b2 83
7 2 a 84 5a 57 86 ff 1f 30 14 36 88 d2 d7 70 74
8 b1 6 d3 98 87 8e 38 77 99 96 8a 67 46 6d f5 1d
9 3a 1b 37 ee 3b 81 e1 df d1 93 cc 91 b8 3c 51 a9
a d5 1a 2b 59 b 12 bd f7 a0 2d 78 76 71 cd 8b 18
b e8 11 ad be e2 7e 0 a8 cb 9b fa 58 9f ef f6 94
c ed 27 ba f 2f d c 54 21 73 b0 19 f4 8d c8 6e
d 89 48 c5 23 64 47 7c 16 c1 fd e7 cf ea 15 da a7
e 7 e9 c3 44 a2 e 79 7a 3e 90 6a fc a5 56 b3 dd
f 66 c9 dc b5 ae af 68 f2 17 42 55 d9 3 c0 1c fe
Table 2: An S-Box generated from a semifield with maximal linear and differ-
ential invariants
5.2 APN functions based on semifields
Vectorial boolean functions obtaining the best possible result for the δ invariant,
i.e. δ = 2, are called almost perfect non-linear functions (denoted APN). For
instance, in [2], the cube function is APN over the finite field with 256 elements.
As previously, we mimic this function on semifields, instead of finite fields. In
F28 = F24 [X ]/P , with P an irreducible polynomial of the form X
2 + αX + β,
the cube function is defined as (aX + b) 7→ (cX + d) such that (aX + b)3 =
(cX + d), a, b, c, d ∈ F28 . One of the possibilities is:
c = [(aa2)α]α − (aa2)β + a(ab) + a(ba) + ab2 − (ba2)α
d = [(aa2)α]β − (ba2)β + b(ab) + b(ba) + bb2.
(7)
Finally, we have generated 2684 APN functions, 336 having perfect avalanche,
and bit independence scores, i.e. AAPNi = 0 and BAPNi = 0.
For instance, one of the APN function obtained is given in Table 3.
5.3 S-Boxes based on S4
4
In [3], the classification of semifields of order 256 has been done for characteristic
four, i.e. S44 . We thus have also tried to construct S-Boxes based on all these
28 semifields up to isotopy, by using the inverse function. However, none of the
thus generated S-Boxes had a couple (δ, λ) = (4, 16), apart from the one build
in the semifield isomorphic to F28 .
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
0 00 01 04 0f 0f 08 02 0f 02 04 08 04 01 01 02 08
1 cf fa c4 fb 12 21 10 29 7c 4e 79 41 ad 99 a1 9f
2 38 58 8e e4 93 f5 2c 40 32 55 8a e7 95 f4 24 4f
3 a4 f0 1d 43 dd 8f 6d 35 1f 4c a8 f1 6a 3f d4 8b
4 a4 6a f1 35 43 8b 1f dd d4 1d 8f 4c 3f f0 6d a8
5 e2 18 b8 48 d7 2b 84 72 23 de 77 80 1a e1 47 b6
6 b1 1e 56 f3 f2 5b 1c bf c9 61 20 82 86 28 66 c2
7 a4 3f 4c dd 35 a8 d4 43 6d f1 8b 1d f0 6a 1f 8f
8 b1 28 61 f2 bf 20 66 f3 1c 82 c2 56 1e 86 c9 5b
9 38 95 e7 40 e4 4f 32 93 24 8e f5 55 f4 58 2c 8a
a e2 1a 80 72 48 b6 23 d7 47 b8 2b de e1 18 84 77
b 38 f4 55 93 40 8a 24 e4 2c e7 4f 8e 58 95 32 f5
c cf 99 4e 12 29 79 a1 fb 10 41 9f c4 fa ad 7c 21
d cf ad 41 29 fb 9f 7c 12 a1 c4 21 4e 99 fa 10 79
e b1 86 82 bf f3 c2 c9 f2 66 56 5b 61 28 1e 1c 20
f e2 e1 de d7 72 77 47 48 84 80 b6 b8 18 1a 23 2b
Table 3: An APN function generated via a pseudo-cube function over a product
of semifields
6 Conclusion
In order to construct new efficient 8× 8 bijective S-Boxes, we replace the usual
finite fields algebraic structure by semifields. However, our current knowledge
about this subject does not allow us to construct directly S28 . We therefore
build pseudo-extensions of degree 2 of S24 . Pseudo-extensions are based on the
notion of pseudo-irreducibility, derived from a characterisation of polynomial
irreducibility in finite fields. This allows us to define in the product of semifields,
a novel function as close as possible to the inverse function in a finite field. We
call it a pseudo-inverse and use it to build new S-Boxes. Many of the obtained S-
Boxes have then very good evaluations on different criterion for cryptographic
resitance. Indeed, we obtained 120 S-Boxes with better scores than those of
already known S-Boxes, including AES and Camellia. We then used the same
technique to generate 2684 novel APN functions by mimicking the cube function.
About bijective S-Boxes and APN functions, some more exhaustive search
could be done via associative variations of Equations (3) and (7). It could also
be interesting to try to adapt to semifields other functions (bijective or not),
like the ones described in [2, §6].
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